The McCollum Memo: A Quiet Spark Before the Storm

October 7, 1940 – A Strategic Blueprint for War - In the quiet corridors of Washington's naval intelligence offices, a memo was drafted on October 7, 1940, that would later ignite fierce debate among historians and conspiracy theorists alike. Known as the McCollum memo, this internal document outlined a provocative strategy: to counter Japanese expansion in East Asia by goading Japan into committing an "overt act of war"-an act that could justify American entry into World War II.

What Was the McCollum Memo?

Authored by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence's Far East Asia section, the memo was addressed to Navy Captains Dudley Knox and Walter Stratton Anderson. It laid out an eight-point plan designed to check Japanese aggression and, if successful, provoke a military response that would rally American support for war.

The Eight-Point Strategy Included:

• Securing British and Dutch base access in the Pacific

• Supporting Chinese resistance against Japan

• Deploying U.S. naval forces to strategic Pacific locations

• Enforcing a full embargo on Japanese trade, especially oil

McCollum noted that "it is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado." But if Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, "so much the better."

Context: America's Reluctance and Roosevelt's Dilemma

In 1940, the United States was deeply isolationist. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had campaigned on keeping America out of Europe's war. Yet the Axis powers-Germany, Italy, and Japan-were expanding aggressively. Japan had already invaded China and was eyeing Southeast Asia. Germany had overrun much of Europe.

Roosevelt faced a strategic bind: how to support Britain and contain Japan without violating public promises or provoking backlash. The McCollum memo offered one possible solution-indirect provocation.

Did It Lead to Pearl Harbor?

The memo itself was not a directive, and there's no clear evidence Roosevelt saw it. But many of its recommendations were later implemented. In July 1941, the U.S. imposed a crippling oil embargo on Japan. Japan responded by planning a military strike to secure resources-culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Author Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit, argued that the memo was part of a deliberate conspiracy to provoke Japan. However, military historians like Conrad Crane have rejected this interpretation, calling it a distortion of McCollum's intent. McCollum himself later denied advocating for war through deception.

Legacy and Lessons

The McCollum memo remains a fascinating artifact of pre-war strategy-revealing how intelligence officers grappled with geopolitical constraints and public opinion. For Alabama educators and historians, it offers a case study in wartime decision-making, the ethics of provocation, and the murky line between strategy and manipulation.